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UNDER ATTACK: THE PUBLIC’S RIGHT TO
KNOW AND THE WAR ON TERROR
Mary-Rose Papandrea*
Abstract: Since the September 11 attacks, courts have been reluctant to
uphold the public’s right to obtain government information through the
Freedom of Information Act and the First Amendment right of access.
Given the doctrinal and statutory confusion plaguing both FOIA and the
First Amendment right of access since their inception, and the judiciary’s
historic tendency to defer to the Executive in matters implicating national
security, recent appellate decisions rejecting right to know claims may
seem unsurprising. But a closer reading of these cases reveals that the
judiciary’s failure to uphold the public’s right to government transpar-
ency has been based on a fundamental lack of appreciation for and
hostility to the right’s very existence. These cases suggest that an
enforceable right to know is unnecessary because the political process is
adequate to force government disclosure. History amply demonstrates,
however, the political process’s incapacity to compel government disclos-
ure, particularly when the nation is in a time of crisis and the government
activities at issue concern noncitizens.
Introduction
Since the September 11 attacks, the government has used nontra-
ditional methods to detain, process, and prosecute individuals allegedly
engaged in terrorist activities. One clear beneªt of these nontraditional
procedures has been that the government has been able to control the
ºow of information concerning its counterterrorism efforts by relying
on the processes to which the public’s constitutional and statutory
“right to know” is at least arguably inapplicable. In addition, the gov-
ernment has capitalized on the judiciary’s hesitation to force the dis-
closure of any information that will allegedly harm national security.
The judiciary’s general unwillingness to enforce the “right to
know” in a time of crisis is not surprising given the relatively short and
tortured history of this right under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) and the First Amendment. In addition to this long-standing
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doctrinal confusion, the courts’ historic deference to the Executive’s
analysis of national security risks made the decisions even less surpris-
ing. But what was surprising was that, by rejecting the right of access
claims, courts revealed a singular lack of appreciation of and almost
hostility to the right of access, particularly when the subjects of the de-
sired information and proceedings were noncitizens. Not only did the
courts defer to the Executive’s national security claims, but they also
deferred to the assumption about noncitizens that biased these claims:
namely, that noncitizens are more likely than not to be involved in ter-
rorist activities. Moreover, the courts exhibited a naive reliance upon
the capacity of the political process to force government disclosure.
History has demonstrated that without an enforceable right to know
about government activities, the executive branch is likely to reveal only
the information that serves its purposes, whatever they may be.
This Article suggests that the courts must keep in mind the inter-
est in effective self-government that drove FOIA’s passage in 1966 and
the recognition of the First Amendment right of access in 1980. The
right to know is more, not less, important in a time of crisis, and it is
no less important when the rights of noncitizens are at issue. Indeed,
history amply demonstrates that it is during times of crisis that the gov-
ernment is more likely to engage in questionable behavior and
employ secrecy to conceal its failures.
Part I discusses the history and development of the public’s consti-
tutional and statutory rights of access to government information and
proceedings. Although the right to know has been ªrmly established
for over thirty years, even prior to September 11, courts hesitated to
compel the government to disclose any information that allegedly in-
volved national security. In addition, courts had already been struggling
with some doctrinal difªculties encountered in deªning and applying
the First Amendment right of access.
Part II discusses the government’s efforts to circumvent this “right
to know” by detaining noncitizens incommunicado in Guantanamo
Bay, labeling some U.S. citizens “enemy combatants,” and gagging oth-
ers tried in the criminal justice system. Although the government pur-
ports to be more forthcoming with information about U.S. citizens who
are suspected of engaging in terrorist activities, the public’s knowledge
of these individuals in reality is one-sided and woefully inadequate to
scrutinize government actions. Part II summarizes the two appellate
court decisions reviewing the closure of immigration hearings for the
hundreds of aliens rounded up after September 11, and a third appel-
late court decision rejecting a FOIA request for basic information
about these detainees.
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Part III argues that these decisions were in some ways not surpris-
ing given the doctrinal confusion that has plagued the right of access
since its beginnings. But what was disturbing about these decisions is
that they represent a return to the days prior to 1970, when the judici-
ary regarded the right of access as unnecessary for a functional democ-
racy; instead, courts said the political process alone sufªciently checked
government power. Historically, however, the political process has
proven impotent and incapable of forcing disclosures of information
the government prefers to keep secret, especially when the rights of
noncitizens are at issue.
I. The History of the Right to Know
The “right to know” has no single deªnition. When scholars and
courts cite to the “right to know,” they may be referring to a number
of different things, including “the rights to receive information from
willing sources, to gather information from willing or neutral sources,
and to acquire information from a perhaps unwilling governmental
source.”1 The ªrst two require the government to refrain from ac-
tion—namely, to refrain from interfering with information dissemina-
tion or consumption. The last, however, requires the government to
provide information for public debate.2 It is this “afªrmative” right to
know, also known as the right of access, on which this Article focuses.
The public’s statutory and constitutional rights to access federal
government information and proceedings are relatively new. Before
the FOIA was passed in 1966, the executive branch agencies could, in
essence, deny access to information at will. As Harold Cross reported
in his seminal 1954 work on the right of access, “[t]he dismaying, be-
wildering fact is that in the absence of a general or speciªc act of
Congress creating a clear right to inspect—and such acts are not nu-
merous—there is no enforceable legal right in public or press to in-
spect any federal non-judicial record.”3 Although the common law
provided a limited right of access to judicial documents, it was only in
                                                                                                                     
1 David Mitchell Ivester, The Constitutional Right to Know, 4 Hastings Const. L.Q. 109,
109 (1977).
2 See Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy in the Immigration Courts and Beyond: Considering the Right to
Know in the Administrative State, 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95, 102–03 (2004) (drawing a
distinction between “negative structuralism,” which prevents the government from inter-
fering with the dissemination and consumption of speech, with “afªrmative structuralism,”
which requires the government to provide access to its proceedings or information in its
possession).
3 Harold L. Cross, The People’s Right to Know 197 (1954).
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1980 that the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment guaran-
teed the public a right of access to criminal trials.4
FOIA and the First Amendment right of access are powerful
mechanisms by which the press and public alike can force the disclo-
sure of and obtain access to government documents and proceedings.
Even before September 11, 2001, however, the judiciary struggled to
apply these rights. Courts reviewing FOIA claims have always been ex-
tremely reluctant to question the government’s assertion that releas-
ing the requested information would threaten national security. Like-
wise, courts have struggled to make sense of how to apply the
constitutional right of access outside the context of criminal trials. In
light of all of the difªculties existing before the terrorist attacks on
U.S. soil, it is perhaps not surprising that the courts stumbled after
September 11 when asked to force information disclosures that, the
government claimed, would threaten national security.
A. First Amendment Right of Access
The United States Supreme Court did not recognize the existence
of a First Amendment right of access until it decided Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia in 1980.5 Prior to that decision, the Court had never
acknowledged such a right, and in fact its decisions suggested that it
never would. After its Richmond Newspapers decision, the Court decided
three more First Amendment right of access cases in quick succession,
extending the right of access to pretrial hearings and voir dire proceed-
ings. Since the mid-1980s, however, the Court has left the development
of the doctrine to the lower courts.6 The appellate courts appear to have
reached a consensus that the right of access extends to civil trials, but
even before September 11, they have deeply disagreed about whether
and how to apply the Richmond Newspapers history-and-logic test outside
of traditional judicial proceedings. For this reason, the courts’ struggle
to apply the right of access after September 11 can be seen as simply a
continuation of the doctrinal difªculties that have plagued the right
since its inception. More disturbingly, however, these recent cases con-
                                                                                                                     
4 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
5 See id. (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the public’s right to attend
criminal trials).
6 See Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse”: The First Amendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. Rich. L. Rev. 237, 263–69 (1995) (discussing the holdings of
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior
Court I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986),
as well as lower court right of access cases).
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tain echoes of the Court’s decisions to prior Richmond Newspapers, where
the Court questioned the very desirability of any such right.
1. Prior to Richmond Newspapers
In his concurring opinion in the Richmond Newspapers, Justice
Stevens noted the monumental nature of the decision: “This is a wa-
tershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never
before has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter
is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever.”7
In decisions preceding Richmond Newspapers, the Court seemed to
reject a First Amendment right of access. As one scholar noted, the
right “had been so consistently and emphatically rejected by the Su-
preme Court that by the late 1970s, it was considered an all but dead
letter.”8
Early First Amendment cases recognized the right of private enti-
ties to impart—and of the public to receive—information. For exam-
ple, in Grosjean v. American Press Co., the Court declared unconstitu-
tional a state tax on the advertising revenues of newspapers.9 In
reaching its holding, the Court explained that “informed public opin-
ion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment,” and that
the tax, designed “to limit the circulation of information” to the public,
went “to the heart of the natural right of the members of an organized
society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire informa-
tion about their common interests.”10 In other cases, the Court rejected
a prohibition on door-to-door distribution of literature11 and the Post-
master’s detention of Communist propaganda.12 These decisions rec-
ognized that the government cannot interfere with an individual’s con-
stitutional right to receive information from a willing speaker. Although
these cases emphasized the importance of an informed public in a de-
                                                                                                                     
7 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8 Cerruti, supra note 6, at 238.
9 297 U.S. 233, 240, 251 (1936).
10 Id. at 243, 250.
11 See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 142, 149 (1943).
12 See Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 302, 307 (1965). In Zemel v. Rusk, de-
cided the same Term, the Court rejected the argument that the government’s refusal to
permit travel to Cuba unconstitutionally interfered with the right to obtain information.
See 381 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). The Court characterized the travel restriction as “an inhibition of
action,” not speech, and that in any event, “[t]he right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information.” Id. at 16–17.
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mocracy, none addressed whether the First Amendment gave the pub-
lic the right to force the government to disclose information.
In the 1970s, the Court decided a trio of prison access cases that
seemed to sound the death knell for any First Amendment right of ac-
cess to government information: Pell v. Procunier,13 Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co.,14 and Houchins v. KQED, Inc.15 Pell and Saxbe concerned sub-
stantially similar state and federal prison regulations that prohibited
journalists from interviewing willing inmates the reported had se-
lected.16 In both cases, the journalists argued that the regulations vio-
lated their First Amendment right to collect and publish information of
great public concern.17 Rather than directly confronting the alleged
First Amendment right of access to information, the Court construed
the issue as one of comparative access given to the press and the public.
Deeming the disputed regulations in Pell and Saxbe indistinguishable,
the Court held that the government had no duty to provide the press
with information that was not generally available to the public; because
both the federal and state regulations granted the press access equal to
that given to the public, the reporters’ First Amendment claims failed.18
In both cases, although the public was given some access to the prisons,
the general tone of the two opinions suggested that a majority of the
justices believed that the First Amendment provided no afªrmative
right of access to government information at all. Indeed, Justices Pow-
ell, Brennan, and Marshall noted as much in their Pell and Saxbe dis-
sents, arguing that “[f]rom all that appears in the Court’s opinion, one
would think that any governmental restriction on access to informa-
tion, no matter how severe, would be constitutionally acceptable to the
                                                                                                                     
13 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
14 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
15 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“Neither the First Amendment nor the
Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources
of information within the government’s control.”).
16 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 819; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 844. Pell concerned a regulation of the
California Department of Corrections, which provided that “[p]ress and other media in-
terviews with speciªc individual inmates will not be permitted.” 417 U.S. at 819. At issue in
Saxbe was a federal regulation that provided that:
[p]ress representatives will not be permitted to interview individual inmates.
This rule shall apply even where the inmate requests or seeks an interview.
However, conversation may be permitted with inmates whose identity is not to
be made public, if it is limited to the discussion of institutional facilities, pro-
grams and activities.
417 U.S. at 844 n.1.
17 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 829–30; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 845.
18 See Pell, 417 U.S. at 834–35; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850.
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majority so long as it does not single out the media for special disabili-
ties not applicable to the public at large.”19
Houchins, decided only a few years after Pell and Saxbe, involved
an even more restrictive prison access regulation, but the plurality’s
hostility to an afªrmative right of access was more vehement and di-
rect.20 Only seven justices took part in the decision.21 Although the
question presented in the case was whether the press had a greater
right of access to government-controlled information than the public,
Chief Justice Burger, writing the plurality opinion joined by Justices
White and Rehnquist, held that there was no such right of access at
all.22 Burger drew a distinction between the First Amendment right to
communicate acquired information and the asserted right to compel
the government to produce information, noting that while the
Court’s opinions had repeatedly recognized the former, it had never
endorsed the latter.23
In rejecting an afªrmative right of access, Burger expressed con-
cern that such recognition would “invite[] the Court to involve itself in
what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the
political processes.”24 He explained that “[p]ublic bodies and public
ofªcers . . . may be coerced by public opinion to disclose what they
might prefer to conceal.”25 According to Burger, the Constitution does
not require the government to disclose information; instead, “we must
rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of the politi-
cal forces in American society.”26 Burger pointed out that broadcasters
remained free to receive (and publish) information about the prison
from inmates, visitors to the prison, public ofªcials, and institutional
personnel.27 He also expressed concern about the lack of existing stan-
                                                                                                                     
19 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Pell, 417 U.S. at 835 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 836 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20 See 438 U.S. at 3, 9, 15.
21 Id. at 16. The two absent justices were Justices Blackmun and Marshall. Id.
22 See id. at 3, 9. “The question presented is whether the news media have a constitu-
tional right of access to a county jail, over and above that of other persons, to interview
inmates and make sound recordings, ªlms, and photographs for publication and broad-
casting by newspapers, radio, and television.” Id. at 3.
23 See id. at 9 (noting that, “[t]his Court has never intimated a First Amendment guar-
antee of a right of access to all sources of information within government control. Nor
does the rationale of the decisions upon which respondents rely lead to the implication of
such a right.”).
24 Id. at 12.
25 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 14.
26 Id. at 14, 15 (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 636
(1975)).
27 Id. at 15.
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dards governing a First Amendment right of access: “Because the Con-
stitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory standards, hundreds of
judges would . . . be at large to fashion [ad hoc] standards, in individual
cases, according to their own ideas of what seems ‘desirable’ or ‘expe-
dient.’”28 In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Stewart agreed that
the Constitution does not give the public a right of access to informa-
tion and instead “does no more than assure the public and the press
equal access once government has opened its doors.”29
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Powell, disagreed with the plurality’s conclusion that the First
Amendment does not guarantee the public a right of access to gov-
ernment information.30 Drawing upon the political theory arguments
that would later become the foundation for Richmond Newspapers,
Stevens argued that “[t]he preservation of a full and free ºow of in-
formation to the general public has long been recognized as a core
objective of the First Amendment to the Constitution.”31 As Justice
Powell had done in his Saxbe dissent, Stevens observed that the Court
had long interpreted the First Amendment as embracing not only the
right to communicate information in one’s possession, but also the
right to receive information and ideas.32 Citing Alexander Meiklejohn
and James Madison, he explained that the right to receive informa-
tion is based on the need for an informed citizenry, which is essential
for self-government.33
One ªnal pre-Richmond Newspapers case bears mentioning. In
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, the Court held in a split decision that the
press had no right of access to pretrial criminal proceedings.34 Al-
though the petitioner’s challenge implicated both the First and Sixth
Amendments, the majority’s opinion chieºy addressed only the Sixth
                                                                                                                     
28 Id. at 14.
29 Id. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion was no sur-
prise. In 1975, Justice Stewart wrote a law review article famously declaring that:
[t]here is no constitutional right to have access to particular government in-
formation, or to require openness from the bureaucracy. The public’s interest
in knowing about its government is protected by the guarantee of a Free
Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution is neither a Freedom of
Information Act nor an Ofªcial Secrets Act.
Stewart, supra note 26, at 636.
30 See Houchins, 438 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
31 See id. at 30.
32 See id.; Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862–63.
33 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 31–32.
34 443 U.S. 368, 370, 394 (1979) (5–4 decision).
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Amendment claim.35 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared
that the Sixth Amendment “right to a speedy and public trial” was a
right that was “personal to the accused.”36 He conceded that the pub-
lic had a strong interest in open trials, and that “[o]penness in court
proceedings may improve the quality of testimony, induce unknown
witnesses to come forward with relevant testimony, cause all trial par-
ticipants to perform their duties more conscientiously, and generally
give the public an opportunity to observe the judicial system.”37 De-
spite this, however, Stewart maintained that the public had no right
independent of the accused to assert a Sixth Amendment right to an
open trial.38 After all, he declared, “our adversary system of criminal
justice is premised upon the proposition that the public interest is
fully protected by the participants in the litigation.”39
In Gannett, the Court speciªcally rejected the petitioner’s invita-
tion “to narrow [its] rulings in Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins at least to the
extent of recognizing a First and Fourteenth Amendment right to at-
tend criminal trials.”40 The majority explained that “[w]e need not
decide in the abstract . . . whether there is any such constitutional
right” because “even assuming, arguendo, that the First and Four-
teenth Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations, a
question we do not decide,” the trial court properly rejected this al-
leged right of access, because, among other things, the petitioner
failed to object in a timely manner to the closure orders.41 Although
Justice Rehnquist wrote separately to argue that the petitioner had no
First Amendment right of access, and Justice Powell wrote separately
to assert the right’s existence, but that the interest in a fair trial car-
ried more weight, the dissenters acknowledged the petitioner’s First
Amendment claim by stating only that “this Court heretofore has not
found, and does not today ªnd, any First Amendment right of access
                                                                                                                     
35 See Cerruti, supra note 6, at 257 (noting that “[a]lthough the petitioners had relied
principally upon the First Amendment to challenge the closure order, this issue all but
disappeared from the ªve separate opinions in the case. The matter was treated by the
Justices on both sides almost exclusively as a Sixth Amendment issue.”).
36 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 379–80.
37 Id. at 383.
38 See id. at 384.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 392.
41 See Gannett, 443 U.S. at 392.
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to judicial or other governmental proceedings,” and that accordingly
the dissent would focus on the Sixth Amendment claim.42
Although none of the Court’s pre-1980 decisions ever squarely
determined whether the public enjoyed a First Amendment right of
access or right to information, the dicta of the majority and plurality
opinions in these cases certainly made the Court’s eventual recogni-
tion of such a right appear implausible at best.
2. The Revolutionary Richmond Newspapers Decision
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia marked a seismic shift in the
Court’s interpretation of the First Amendment. In this case the Court
recognized, for the ªrst time, that the First Amendment played a struc-
tural role in requiring an open government.43 After several years of
opinions wherein the Court seemingly rejected the notion of a First
Amendment right of access, seven of the eight justices deciding Rich-
mond Newspapers declared that the First Amendment did in fact guaran-
tee the press and public a right of access to the government.44 Although
the case directly concerned the public’s right to attend a criminal trial,
the opinion’s theoretical implications were much broader.
Neither Chief Justice Burger, writing a plurality opinion joined by
Justices White and Stevens, nor Justice Brennan, writing a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Marshall, found the lack of an explicit con-
stitutional provision guaranteeing the right of access to be a barrier.45
Instead, Burger explained, like the rights of association and of privacy,
the right of access is “implicit” in the enumerated rights.46 Underlying
this implicit right, Burger elaborated, is the long history of open
criminal trials in both England and colonial America.47 Citing schol-
ars such as Jeremy Bentham and William Blackstone, who had argued
that public scrutiny is the best “check” on perjury, bias, and other
misconduct by trial participants,48 Burger noted the “signiªcant
                                                                                                                     
42 See id. at 398–99, 402 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 403–04 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring); id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
43 See 448 U.S. at 580 (holding that the First Amendment guarantees the public’s right
to attend criminal trials) (Burger, J., plurality op.).
44 See id. Justice Powell did not take part in the decision. Id. at 581. Justice Rehnquist
was the lone dissenter. See id. at 604.
45 See id. at 579–80.
46 Id.
47 See id. at 564–69, 573.
48 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569. Bentham stated:
Without publicity, all other checks are insufªcient: in comparison of publicity,
all other checks are of small account. Recordation, appeal, whatever other in-
2005] The Public's Right to Know and the War on Terror 45
community therapeutic value” of public trials by “providing an outlet
for community concern, hostility, and emotion.”49 Open trials can
thus function to restrain “self-help” measures and vigilantism, Burger
explained, because regardless of the result, public trials “operat[e] to
restore the imbalance which was created by the offense or public
charge, to reafªrm the temporarily lost feeling of security and, per-
haps, to satisfy that latent ‘urge to punish.’”50 If the public is excluded
from the process, it cannot be sure that “justice” is being done, and
“an unexpected outcome can cause a reaction that the system at best
has failed and at worst has been corrupted.”51
Finally, the Burger plurality stated that openness is essential for
the proper functioning of government itself, as it increases “respect
for the law” and knowledge of “the methods of government,” while
also securing strong conªdence in judicial remedies that “could never
be inspired by a system of secrecy.”52 Public attendance at trials en-
ables citizens to understand the judicial process both generally and in
a particular case. Burger remarked that “[p]eople in an open society
do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difªcult for
them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.”53 Because
the trial court failed to consider a First Amendment right of access
and alternatives short of total closure, Burger reversed the trial court’s
judgment.54
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Bren-
nan explicitly emphasized that the right of access plays a structural role
“in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government.”55
For Brennan, it is insufªcient to protect only the rights of a speaker and
a listener.56 He explained that the First Amendment protects not only
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” public debate, “but also the ante-
                                                                                                                     
stitutions might present themselves in the character of checks, would be
found to operate rather as cloaks than checks; as cloaks in reality, as checks
only in appearance.
Id. (quoting 1 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827)).
49 Id. at 570–71.
50 See id. at 571 (quoting Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and
Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 6 (1961)).
51 See id.
52 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 572 (quoting Bentham, supra note 48, at 525).
53 Id.
54 Id. at 580–81.
55 See id. at 587, 589–95 (Brennan, J., concurring).
56 See id. at 586–87.
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cedent assumption that valuable public debate . . . must be informed.”57
At the same time, Brennan recognized that the right of access could be
“theoretically endless,” and proposed two “helpful principles” to de-
termine whether the right of access attached in a particular case: the
history of openness of a proceeding, and the value of openness to the
proceeding itself.58 Applying both principles to criminal trials, Brennan
concluded that they indicated that trials should be presumptively open
to the public.59
In the six years following Richmond Newspapers, the Court’s deci-
sions in three additional First Amendment right of access cases de-
clared that the presumptive right of access applied to voir dire proceed-
ings, sexual assault trials, and preliminary hearings.60 Although the four
separate opinions in Richmond Newspapers left unclear what standard the
lower courts should apply to determine whether a presumptive First
Amendment right of access attaches, in these subsequent cases the
Court adopted a two-prong history-and-logic test derived from Justice
Brennan’s Richmond Newspapers concurrence.61 This inquiry requires
the consideration of two factors: (1) whether the proceeding has tradi-
tionally been open to the public, and (2) whether public access to the
proceeding at issue would play a positive role.62 If the right of access
attaches, the proceeding can only be closed only if the court makes
speciªc ªndings that a “compelling governmental interest” necessitates
closure, and that the closure is “narrowly tailored” to serve that inter-
est.63 By applying a strict scrutiny standard, the Court made clear that
the public’s First Amendment right of access rises to the same level as
the right to communicate.64
                                                                                                                     
57 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (quoting, in part, N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
58 See id. at 588–89 (quoting William J. Brennan, Jr., Address, 32 Rutgers L. Rev. 173,
177 (1979)).
59 See id. at 598.
60 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13 (preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S.
at 510, 513 (voir dire proceedings); Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 610–11 (sexual assault tri-
als).
61 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9 (quoting Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605–06);
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605–06 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring)); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580–81 (Burger, J., plurality op.); id.
at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600–01 (Stewart, J., concurring). Some dissenting
justices disagreed with this notion.
62 Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8.
63 See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07.
64 See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07. In his dis-
sent in Globe Newspaper, Chief Justice Burger, however, argued that the right of access
should not be treated the same as the right to disseminate information or to discuss ideas
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Commentators have attacked Richmond Newspapers and its progeny
on a number of levels, most vigorously for the Court’s failure to recon-
cile its recognition of a First Amendment right of access with its prior
decisions in Pell, Saxbe, Houchins, and Gannett,65 as well as the practical
and theoretical difªculties of applying the history and logic tests.66
Rather than confront these criticisms, the Supreme Court has instead
declined to decide a First Amendment right of access case since 1986.67
Accordingly, the task of developing the doctrine has been left to the
lower courts.68 All courts considering the issue have extended the right
of access to civil proceedings, but courts have disagreed as to whether
the right applies outside of the judicial context, particularly to execu-
tive agency proceedings.69 They have also disagreed about what sort of
historical “pedigree” satisªes the “history” prong of the Richmond News-
                                                                                                                     
publicly, and that instead the court should merely ask whether the restriction is “reason-
able” and then balance the competing interests of access and closure. Globe Newspaper, 457
U.S. at 615–16 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that “the right of access is
plainly not coextensive with the right of expression” because closure laws “do not deter
protected activity in the way that other laws sometimes interfere with the right of expres-
sion.” Id. at 621. Justice Stevens also dissented in Press-Enterprise II, noting that the right of
access is protected by the First Amendment but does not rise to the same level as “a right
to publish or otherwise communicate information lawfully or unlawfully acquired.” See 478
U.S. at 17–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
65 See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213 (3d Cir. 2002)
(highlighting that the problem with the “history” prong is a lack of guidelines as to how
much time need elapse before something meets the test; a string of cases show that a
“1000-year history is unnecessary,” but a 38-year-old presumption of openness created by a
Department of Justice regulation is too recent).
66 Justice Burger’s plurality in Richmond Newspapers merely stated in a footnote that Pell
and Saxbe “are distinguishable in the sense that they were concerned with penal institu-
tions which, by deªnition, are not ‘open’ or public places.” 448 U.S. at 576 n.11. Justice
Brennan mentions in his concurring opinion that “the First Amendment has not been
viewed by the Court in all settings as providing an equally categorical assurance of the
correlative freedom of access to information.” Id. at 585 (Brennan, J., concurring) (cita-
tions omitted). Several commentators have criticized the Court’s failure to reconcile its
prior case law adequately. See, e.g., Leonard G. Leverson, Constitutional Limits on the Power to
Restrict Access to Prisons: An Historical Re-Examination, 18 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 409, 438
(1983) (noting that Richmond Newspapers’ “plurality opinion . . . strained noticeably as it
attempted to reconcile the Court’s reversal of the trial closure with the Court’s previous
holdings in Pell and Saxbe”); Lillian R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reºections
on Richmond Newspapers, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 311, 320–24 (1982) (criticizing Justice
Burger for failing to ªt new doctrine in with precedent); Archibald Cox, Foreword: Freedom
of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 26 (1980) (stating that “surely, some
effort to explain the relation between the decision in Richmond Newspapers and those ear-
lier cases was required.”).
67 See Cerruti, supra note 6, at 263.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 263, 266–69.
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papers test, what role the “logic” prong plays, and how to balance the
two prongs.70 Given such widespread disagreement, the applicability of
the right of access to nontraditional proceedings would be a tricky issue
for any court at any time, much less during a time of crisis when the
government claims that secrecy is necessary for national security.
B. The Freedom of Information Act
Although some courts and commentators have argued that the
First Amendment right of access logically extends to government
documents, most courts have rejected this view outside the context of
judicial records. Instead, the public’s right to obtain government
documents and information is based largely on the Freedom of In-
formation Act, or FOIA.71 The passage of FOIA in 1966 revolutionized
the public’s ability to force the government to release information. In
the almost four decades since its creation, however, courts have been
extremely reluctant to question government assertions that national
security demands the continued conªdentiality of the requested in-
formation. This has not changed despite congressional efforts to
amend FOIA in order to encourage greater judicial scrutiny of these
national security claims.
Such deference is hardly novel. At the time of the nation’s found-
ing, executive ofªcials had unfettered discretion to disclose or withhold
government documents. The Housekeeping Statute of 1789 authorized
the heads of executive departments to issue regulations concerning the
custody, use, and preservation of its records and materials.72 Agencies
typically used this statute to keep documents from the public. The stat-
ute contained neither a requirement that executive ofªcials release any
information nor any mechanism for judicial review of non-disclosure
determinations.73
                                                                                                                     
70 See id. at 269.
71 See Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 107–
306, 110 Stat. 3048 (2003) (original version at Pub. L No. 89–554 (1966)). The public has
a common law right of access to government records and documents, including judicial
documents. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). It is un-
clear, however, whether FOIA supplanted the common law right of access to federal agency
documents. Cf. Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936–37
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that FOIA preempted the common law right of access to agency
information).
72 Ch. 14, § 7, 1 Stat. 68 (1789) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 301(2000)).
73 See id. When ªrst enacted, the Act provided: “The head of an Executive department
or military department may prescribe regulations for the government of his department,
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During the New Deal and World War II, government bureaucracy
grew, as did the public’s demand for a more open government. In
1946, Congress passed the ªrst legislation that attempted to encour-
age the disclosure of government records.74 Section 3 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA) required agencies to disclose their pro-
cedures, opinions, and records.75 Unfortunately, section 3 also
covered only a limited universe of documents and was riddled with
vague language. The statute provided a right of access only to “per-
sons properly and directly concerned,” and even then only to the
undeªned category of “matters of ofªcial record.”76 Even more trou-
bling, agencies were entitled to withhold information if they deter-
mined that secrecy was “in the public interest,” and no remedy existed
for an agency’s wrongful refusal to release information.77 Agencies
relied on both the Housekeeping Act and the APA to justify their de-
cisions to withhold information from the public.78
In 1958, Congress tried to constrain the executive branch’s right
to withhold information from the public with an amendment to the
Housekeeping Statute, which declared that the statute “does not
authorize withholding information from the public or limiting the
availability of records to the public.”79 Although the House and Sen-
ate both passed this amendment unanimously, agencies continued to
withhold documents from the public by relying on the limitations of
section 3 of the APA.80
By the end of the 1960s, it was clear that amendments to section 3
were required to foster openness in government activities.81 Recogniz-
ing that comprehensive standards for disclosure and the right of judi-
                                                                                                                     
the conduct of its employees, the distribution and performance of its business, and the
custody, use, and preservation of its records, papers, and property.” Id.
74 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79–404, § 3, 60 Stat. 237, 238 (1946)
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).
75 See id.
76 See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
77 Id. The APA also permitted “matters of record” to be withheld “for good cause
found.” § 3(c).
78 1 James T. O’Reilly, Federal Information Disclosure § 2:2 (3d ed. 2000).
79 Act of Aug. 12, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85–619, 72 Stat. 547 (amending Rev. Stat. § 161
(1875)) (codiªed at 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970)).
80 See O’Reilly, supra note 78, § 2:2.
81 See Mink, 410 U.S. at 79 (explaining that Section 3 “was generally recognized as fal-
ling far short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more as a withholding
statute than a disclosure statute”).
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cial review were necessary in order to provide public access to govern-
ment records, Congress replaced section 3 with FOIA in 1966.82
Under FOIA, the public need not demonstrate a “need to know”
to gain access to government documents; instead, FOIA creates a
statutory “right to know.”83 A person requesting documents also need
not show any particular interest in or need for them; FOIA protects
an individual’s right to obtain documents for any purpose.84 Unlike its
precursor, section 3, FOIA also provides for de novo judicial review of
an agency’s decision to withhold documents.85
Recognizing the need to strike a balance between the right to
know and the often compelling need to keep information private,
Congress structured nine exemptions to FOIA’s mandatory disclosure
provisions.86 FOIA itself does not contain a broad “national security”
exemption, but addresses national security directly only in Exemption
1, which exempts from disclosure information that has been classiªed
pursuant to an Executive order.87
In an effort to limit the amount of information that could be
withheld under the vague pre-FOIA “public interest” standard, and to
force the Executive to be more speciªc about its reasons for withhold-
ing information, Exemption 1 excuses from disclosure matters that are
                                                                                                                     
82 See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
83 See id. In the original FOIA, any person or entity could make a request for information
or documents. Id. In 2002, Congress amended FOIA so as to bar requests from foreign gov-
ernments, international governmental organizations, or their representatives for intelligence
agency records. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (2002), Pub. L. No.
107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 2390–91 (codiªed at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (E)) (2000 & Supp.
2003)).
84 See Pub. L. No. 104–231, § 2(a)(1), 110 Stat. 304 (1996) (explaining that the pur-
pose of FOIA is to provide a right of inspection “for any public or private purpose”).
85 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B).
86 See id. § 552(b)(1)–(9). The exemptions state that FOIA does not apply to matters
that fall under the categories of: (1) properly classiªed information pertaining to national
defense or foreign policy, (2) internal agency personnel information, (3) information
exempted by other statutes, (4) trade secrets and other privileged or conªdential business
information, (5) agency memoranda, (6) personnel, medical, and other information the
disclosure of which would invade personal privacy, (7) certain categories of law enforce-
ment investigation records or information, (8) reports from regulated ªnancial institu-
tions, and (9) geological and geophysical information. Id.
87 See id. § 552(b)(1). Exemption 3 provides that FOIA does not apply to information
that is exempted from disclosure under a separate statute. Id. § 552(b)(3). These separate
statutory exemptions often raise national security issues. In addition, FOIA speciªcally
permits the Federal Bureau of Investigation to exercise its discretion in determining
whether to disclose documents that “pertain[] to foreign intelligence or counterintelli-
gence, or international terrorism,” provided these documents constitute classiªed infor-
mation as provided in subsection (b)(1). See id. § 552(c)(3).
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“speciªcally required by Executive order to be kept secret in the inter-
est of the national defense or foreign policy.”88
In 1973, the Supreme Court held in EPA v. Mink that when the
Government claimed that Exemption 1 applied, it had to prove only
that the document was in fact classiªed pursuant to an Executive order
that protected national defense or foreign policy information.89 The
Court held that the courts could not inquire whether information was
in fact properly classiªed or conduct an in camera inspection of
classiªed documents to “separate the secret from the supposedly non-
secret and order disclosure of the latter.”90 In direct reaction to the
Court’s decision, Congress amended the national security exemption of
FOIA in 1974 to make clear that the judiciary should not simply rub-
ber-stamp the Executive’s classiªcation decisions. Congress speciªcally
designed the amendments to Exemption 1 to empower courts to exer-
cise “meaningful judicial review of classiªcation decisions” in order to
rectify the “widespread overclassiªcation abuses in the use of
classiªcation stamps.”91 The 1974 amendments clearly authorized
courts to review classiªed documents in camera for a de novo determi-
nation of their classiªcation, as well as authorized courts to separate
“any reasonably segregable portion of a record . . . after deletion of the
portions which [were subject to an exemption].”92 Even more
signiªcantly, Congress changed Exemption 1’s text: under its amended
phrasing, documents can be withheld only if they are: “(A) speciªcally
authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are
in fact properly classiªed pursuant to such Executive order.”93 A con-
gressional comment on the exemption’s ªnal text noted that it “per-
mit[s] the withholding of information where it is ‘speciªcally author-
ized’ . . . and is ‘in fact, properly classiªed’ pursuant to both procedural
and substantive criteria contained in such Executive order.”94
                                                                                                                     
88 Act of June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90–23, § 1, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (amended 1967); see S.
Rep. 89–813, at 8 (1965). “Exemption No. 1 is for matters speciªcally required by Execu-
tive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy. The
change of standard from ‘in the public interest’ is made both to delimit more narrowly the
exception and to give it a more precise deªnition.” Id.
89 EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 84 (1973).
90 Id.
91 120 Cong. Rec. 17,014, 17,019 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
92 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), (b) (2000).
93 See id.
94 H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93–1380, at 11–12 (1974).
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Although the plain language of FOIA allows courts to review de
novo the Executive’s decision to withhold information on the basis of
Exemption 1, and nothing in FOIA requires judicial deference to the
Executive’s classiªcation decisions, courts nevertheless have uniformly
deferred to the government’s classiªcation determinations. As a re-
sult, courts have not rigorously reviewed classiªed information.95 In
sum, even before September 11, the courts gave extraordinary defer-
ence to the Executive’s claims that national security concerns war-
ranted the secrecy of the requested information.96
II. The Right of Access after September 11
Since September 11, the government has used administrative or
military proceedings to detain and process individuals allegedly in-
volved in terrorist activities. By proceeding in this way, the government
has not only been able to deprive detainees of constitutional protec-
tions, such as the right to counsel, but it has also been able to conduct
its counterterrorism efforts largely outside of public view. So far, efforts
to force disclosure of information pertaining to the government’s
counterterrorism efforts through the First Amendment right of access
and FOIA have been largely unsuccessful.97 Instead, the public has
been forced to rely on the whim of government ofªcials to release in-
formation when it suits them. Although the government appears to be
somewhat more forthcoming with information about detained citizens,
in truth the public’s information remains remarkably one-sided.
                                                                                                                     
95 See The Honorable Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. Pitt.
L. Rev. 753, 760 (1988) (noting that judicial review of classiªed information under FOIA
“often seems to be done in a perfunctory way”).
96 See id. at 760–61.
97 See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (denying FOIA request for information pertaining to post-September 11 detainees);
N. Jersey Media, 308 F. 3d at 198 (upholding broad closure of removal proceedings for de-
tainees); ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20 (D.D.C. 2003) (denying FOIA
request for statistical information regarding the DOJ’s use of Patriot Act surveillance
authority); ACLU v. County of Hudson, 799 A.2d 629 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (de-
nying access to information concerning detainees held in New Jersey facilities). But see
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding broad closure of re-
moval proceedings violated the First Amendment). A federal district court recently or-
dered various government agencies to respond to a FOIA request for information about
detainees in United States custody. ACLU v. Dep’t of Defense, 339 F. Supp. 2d 501, 2004
WL 2050921 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2004). The agencies had failed to give any meaningful
response to the request, which had been made almost a year earlier. The district court
rebuked the government, noting that “the glacial pace at which defendant agencies have
been responding to plaintiff’s requests shows an indifference to the commands of FOIA,
and fails to afford accountability of government that the act requires.” Id. at *3.
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A. Guantanamo Bay, Military Tribunals and Enemy Combatants
The United States has detained hundreds of people captured by
U.S. forces in Afghanistan or neighboring countries in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Many have been held for almost three years without charge
or access to lawyers.98 The U.S. military has closed most of the prison
at Guantanamo Bay to reporters and forbidden visitors from speaking
to detainees.99 Because of the government’s failure to allow meaning-
ful access to the detainees, the public knows little about who is de-
tained at Guantanamo Bay or on what basis. Although international
political pressure has compelled the United States to release some
detainees in the past year, hundreds more essentially remain in secret
detention.100 This high level of secrecy is disconcerting, especially
given reports that many of the detainees have no connection to ter-
rorism and have been subject to abusive treatment.101
After the recent Supreme Court decisions holding that detainees
are entitled to challenge their enemy combatant status through ha-
beas petitions ªled in federal district court,102 the U.S. military has
initiated “Combatant Status Review” hearings in Guantanamo Bay.
Attorneys for the detainees have charged that the military established
these proceedings in the hopes of avoiding federal habeas proceed-
                                                                                                                     
98 John Mintz, U.S. Charges 2 as Bin Laden Aides, Wash. Post, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1.
99 See Scott Higham et al., Guantanamo, Wash. Post, May 2, 2004, at A1.
100 See Associated Press, U.S. Releases 26 Guantanamo Detainees, Wash. Post, Mar. 16,
2004, at A2 (reporting release of twenty-six detainees); Peter Baker, U.S. Sends to Russia 7
Held at Guantanamo, Wash. Post, Mar. 2, 2004, at A14 (discussing release of seven Rus-
sians); Higham, et al., supra note 99 (noting that detainee releases resulted from political
pressure and that, despite releases, 600 detainees remain at Guantanamo); John Mintz,
U.S. Faces Quandary in Freeing Detainees, Wash. Post, Mar. 22, 2004, at A1 (mentioning in-
ternational law experts’ suggestions that U.S. allies have advantage in securing release of
their detainees); Pierre-Antoine Souchard, 4 Frenchmen Freed from Guantanamo, Wash.
Post, July 28, 2004, at A11 (discussing release of four French prisoners and noting the
slow release of prisoners after much international criticism); Don Van Natta, Jr. & Tim
Golden, Ofªcials Detail a Detainee Deal by 3 Countries, N.Y. Times, July 4, 2004, at A1 (noting
U.S. release of ªve Saudi Arabian detainees in exchange for the release of British prison-
ers); Washington in Brief, Wash. Post, Apr. 3, 2004, at A11 (reporting that the United States
had released an additional 15 detainees from different countries). In May 2004, the
United States announced that it planned to conduct periodic reviews of the detention of
enemy combatants held in South Carolina and Guantanamo Bay. See John Mintz, U.S. to
Review Detainees’ Cases, Wash. Post, May 19, 2004, at A18. These reviews would be con-
ducted by a three-judge military panel. Id.
101 Neil A. Lewis, Broad Use of Harsh Tactics Is Described at Cuba Base, N.Y. Times, Oct. 17,
2004, at A1.
102 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2644 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686,
2692 (2004).
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ings and public scrutiny.103 In these hearings, the detainees may testify
and present witnesses who are deemed “reasonably available,” but
they are afforded no access to counsel.104 Instead, they are permitted
to meet with a “personal representative,” an Army ofªcer who is nei-
ther a lawyer nor bound by attorney-client privilege.105 The detainees
also bear the burden of rebutting the presumption that they are in
fact enemy combatants, while having no access to any of the classiªed
evidence that allegedly supports that designation.106
The regulations for the status hearings make no mention of pub-
lic access, and the hearings that have been held so far have been open
to only a few members of the press.107 The military has declared fur-
ther its unwillingness to release the detainees’ names or any other in-
formation it deems to be sensitive.108
The Combatant Status Review proceedings are distinct from trials
to be conducted by the military commissions President Bush established
in November 2001.109 Preliminary proceedings for military trials have
begun only recently, and only for four of the several hundred detain-
ees.110 President Bush instituted the military commissions to prosecute
noncitizens who are allegedly members of al-Qaeda or have “engaged
in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of international ter-
rorism, or acts in preparation therefor.”111 When announcing the crea-
tion of the military tribunals, President Bush declared that in view of the
terrorist threat, “it is not practicable to apply in military commissions
                                                                                                                     
103 Josh White, U.S. to Tell Detainees of Rights: Pentagon Outlines New Procedures, Wash.
Post, July 10, 2004, at A7.
104 Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, to the Secretary of the Navy,
Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal 1–3 ( July 7, 2004), available at http://
www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf.
105 Id. at 1.
106 See Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, supra note 104, at 2, 3.
107 Neil A. Lewis, Scrutiny of Review Tribunals as War Crimes Trials Open, N.Y. Times, Aug.
24, 2004, at A12.
108 See Ian James, Tribunal Weighs Guantanamo Detainee Cases, A.P. Newswires, Aug. 4,
2004.
109 See James, supra note 108; Lewis, supra note 107.
110 Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Terrorism Tribunals Set to Begin Work, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2004, at
22. Lawyers for the detainees have made preliminary motions challenging the tribunals
that are expected to delay the start of the trials themselves until December. See Neil A.
Lewis, Guantanamo Tribunal Process in Turmoil, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2004, at 29. A military
ofªcial recently revealed to the New York Times that the ªrst four detainees facing trial were
chosen speciªcally because they had not been subjected to abusive treatment and would
therefore be less likely to make any allegations embarrassing for the government. See
Lewis, supra note 101.
111 See Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Ter-
rorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833, 57,834 (Nov. 16, 2001).
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under this order the principles of law . . . generally recognized in the
trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.”112 One such
principle is the general presumption that trials are open to the press
and public. After considerable public outcry, the Department of De-
fense released signiªcantly modiªed regulations for the military trials
entitling the detainees to a number of civil rights criminal defendants
enjoy, including the right to an open trial.113 The regulations give the
presiding ofªcer broad discretion to close the proceedings on a number
of grounds, however, and they provide no mechanism for the press or
public to challenge a closure order.114 Any members of the press or hu-
man rights groups attending the trials must sign a ªve-page list of
“ground rules” that permit the government to exercise a measure of
control over the information released to the public.115 For example, ob-
servers may release neither the identities of the detainees nor the identi-
ties of any commission personnel (including the commission members,
prosecutors, or defense counsel) without approval; many detainees,
however, have already been identiªed.116
No U.S. citizens are subject to trial before a military commission,
for the order establishing the tribunals explicitly excludes U.S. citi-
zens.117 As several scholars have argued, the decision to exclude citi-
zens from military tribunals appears politically motivated and lacks a
rational basis.118 The government initially planned to prosecute U.S.
                                                                                                                     
112 Press Release, White House, President Issues Military Order (Nov. 13, 2001), at
http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/print/20011113–27.html.
113 See Dep’t of Defense Military Commission Order No. 1, § 6(B)(3) (Mar. 21, 2002),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/mco/mco1.pdf.
114 See id. The regulations permit the presiding ofªcer to close the hearings for any num-
ber of reasons, including the following grounds: “protection of information classiªed or
classiªable . . . information protected by law or rule from unauthorized disclosure; the physical
safety of participants in Commission proceedings, including prospective witnesses; intelligence
and law enforcement sources, methods, or activities; and other national security interests.” Id.
Whether the public and press will be able to challenge the closure of a military tribunal in
United States courts is an open question. For a discussion of this issue, see The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Military Tribunals, in Homefront Conªdential
(4th ed. 2003), available at http://www.rcfp.org/homefrontconªdential/tribunals.html.
115 See Charlie Savage, Guantanamo Coverage to Be Restricted, Boston Globe, Aug. 27,
2004, at A9; Press Kit, Media Ground Rules for Coverage of Military Commissions (May
2004), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040818PK.pdf.
116 See Press Kit, supra note 115. Using non-governmental sources, the Washington Post has
compiled a list of the names of 367 detainees. See Names of the Detained in Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/guantanamo_names.html (last
visited Sept. 21, 2004).
117 Detention, Treatment, and Trial, supra note 111, at 57,834.
118 See, e.g., David Cole, Their Liberties, Our Security: Democracy and Double Standards, 31
Int’l J. Legal Info. 290, 299 (2003) (arguing that excluding citizens from military tribunals
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citizens in federal court, as it did with the “American Taliban” John
Walker Lindh.119 But when faced with the difªculties of justifying its
prolonged detention of Hamdi and Padilla, the Department of Justice
removed them from the criminal justice system altogether, labeling
them “enemy combatants” who, the government claimed, could be
held indeªnitely. 120
Although the United States detained Hamdi and Padilla in secret
military custody without the ordinary protections of the criminal justice
system, the United States has voluntarily released some information
about both individuals. At the outset, the government revealed their
identities and some of the circumstances of their arrest, which was far
more than it was willing to do for the noncitizens held in Guan-
tanamo.121 The Department of Justice also did not challenge Hamdi’s
or Padilla’s right to ªle a habeas petition, as it did for the Guantanamo
Bay detainees. Instead, the Department of Justice submitted declara-
tions detailing the circumstances of Hamdi’s and Padilla’s capture and
basis for detention.122 In addition, on June 1, 2004, when a decision
from the U.S. Supreme Court on their habeas petitions was imminent,
the Department of Justice spokesman James Comey held a press con-
ference to provide Padilla’s “full story” in an effort to “allow the Ameri-
                                                                                                                     
was likely “a politically opportunistic decision”); George P. Fletcher, On Justice and War: Con-
tradictions in the Proposed Military Tribunals, 25 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 635, 646 (2002)
(commenting that “[n]ot only does the lumping together of all foreigners vastly exceed stan-
dards of relevance, but it also invokes a method of classiªcation—citizen versus foreigner—
that has no reasonable bearing on the supposed objective of protecting the United States
against international terrorism.”); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 Yale L.J. 1259, 1298–1303 (2002) (arguing that the
citizen/noncitizen distinction violates the Equal Protection Clause and is a distinction that
“cannot be understood in immigration or international bargaining terms”).
119 See ‘I Made a Mistake by Joining the Taliban’: Apologetic Lindh Gets 20 Years, Wash. Post,
Oct. 5, 2002, at A1.
120 Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, ‘Dirty Bomb’ Plot Uncovered, U.S. Says: Suspected Al Qaeda
Operative Held as ‘Enemy Combatant’, Wash. Post, June 11, 2002, at A1 (reporting that Padilla
was named an enemy combatant after prosecutors determined that a criminal prosecution
would be “difªcult”); John Mintz, Justice Says It Won’t Charge U.S. Citizen Moved From Cuba: Man
in Custody as Government Deliberates What to Do, Wash. Post, Apr. 9 2002, at A10 (reporting that
the government did not intend to charge Hamdi because it lacked sufªcient evidence for a
criminal prosecution).
121 See Transcript of News Conference on Jose Padilla ( June 1, 2004), at http://www.
cnn.com/2004/LAW/06/01/comey.padilla.transcript/index.html. Indeed, Hamdi, who had
been initially detained in Guantanamo, was not identiªed until military ofªcials discovered
he was a U.S. citizen. Jess Bravin & Greg Jaffe, American Prisoner in Cuba to Be Moved, Wall St.
J., Apr. 5, 2002, at B2.
122 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2636–37 (2004); Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d
695, 700–01 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
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can people to understand the threat he posed, and also understand
that the [P]resident’s decision was and continues to be essential to the
protection of the American people.”123 Comey quite candidly noted
that a primary reason for the release of information about Padilla was
his citizenship status, stating that “[p]eople are right to question when
the [P]resident of the United States orders the military detention of an
American citizen in the United States. And I very much wanted to have
some of the answers for folks. And now we do.”124
But the government’s apparent eagerness to provide information
about the U.S. citizens in its custody is deceptive. In actuality, the pub-
lic’s knowledge about Hamdi and Padilla is strikingly skewed. By re-
moving them from the criminal judicial system, the government effec-
tively curtailed the public scrutiny that accompanies criminal trials.
Labeled as enemy combatants and deprived of access to their attor-
neys for the ªrst two years of their captivity, Hamdi and Padilla have
been unable to respond to the government’s allegations.125 Indeed,
even once they were permitted to speak to counsel, their attorneys
were forbidden to convey anything the detainees said to the public
because the government deemed their communications classiªed.126
In light of the government’s continued assertion that it was entitled to
keep Hamdi detained indeªnitely and incommunicado, it is quite ex-
traordinary that, within two months of the Supreme Court’s decision
holding that Hamdi was entitled to a meaningful opportunity to rebut
the basis for his detention, the government announced that an
agreement for his release was imminent.127 And even more curious is
that after Hamdi’s release, the government has continued to shroud
                                                                                                                     
123 See Transcript of News Conference on Jose Padilla, supra note 121. Comey ex-
plained, “We have decided to release this information to help people understand why we
are doing what we’re doing in the war on terror and to help people understand the nature
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124 See id.
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2004, at A3.
126 Id.
127 See Sonja Barisic, Lawyers Work to Free Former Combatant, (Aug. 11, 2004), at http://
www.boston.com (Boston Globe online). Even after the Justice Department admitted that
Hamdi was no longer a national security threat to the United States, the government con-
tinued to hold him incommunicado in solitary conªnement. See Eric Lichtblau, U.S. Set
Back on Treatment of Combatant, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 2004, at A13. In September 2004, the
government and Hamdi’s lawyers reached an agreement for his release. Eric Lichtblau,
U.S., Bowing to Court Ruling, Will Free ‘Enemy Combatant,’ N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1.
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his case with secrecy by refusing to explain why he no longer posed a
threat to national security.128
The government has also attempted to limit the amount of infor-
mation released about John Walker Lindh, an American citizen who
ultimately pled guilty to assisting the Taliban.129 Before his indictment,
he was held incommunicado as an enemy combatant for ªfty-four days,
despite his request for counsel and his parents’ numerous attempts to
contact him.130 When Lindh was indicted on ten different counts, for
which he faced the possibility of three life sentences, Attorney General
John Ashcroft declared that he was an “an al Qaeda trained terrorist
who conspired with the Taliban to kill his fellow citizens.”131 Within
months, however, nine of the ten charges were dropped, and a plea
agreement reached.132 Despite the apparent disintegration of the gov-
ernment’s case against Lindh, many documents involved in the case
remain classiªed, and Lindh himself has been forbidden from speaking
to the media.133
Although the government professes greater willingness to release
information about American citizens detained as terrorists, the reality
is that the public still has very little information about them. By estab-
lishing military tribunals and labeling individuals as “enemy combat-
ants,” the government has sought to avoid public scrutiny of its coun-
terterrorism efforts that would otherwise be available through the
First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.
B. Administrative Proceedings
Within seven weeks after the September 11 attacks, the govern-
ment had detained over a thousand aliens as part of its counterter-
rorism investigation. In an effort to keep information about these de-
tainees secret, Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy issued a
directive to all U.S. immigration judges ordering heightened security
                                                                                                                     
128 Jerry Markon, Hamdi Returned to Saudi Arabia: U.S. Citizen’s Detention as Enemy Com-
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129 See ‘I Made a Mistake by Joining the Taliban,’ supra note 119.
130 Jane Mayer, Lost in the Jihad, New Yorker, Mar. 10, 2003, at 50, 57.
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measures in “special interest” cases.134 The Creppy Directive offered no
deªnition of this “special interest” category, but the Department of Jus-
tice indicated in litigation that the category included removal proceed-
ings for aliens who “‘might have connections with, or possess informa-
tion pertaining to, terrorist activities against the United States.’”135 In
practice, the government applied this category to all aliens rounded up
during the post-September 11 investigation, regardless of whether ac-
tual evidence existed that they had been involved in terrorist activities.
The Creppy Directive required judges to close the hearings to the pub-
lic, with “no visitors, no family, and no press,” and to neither conªrm
nor deny whether a particular case was even on the docket.136 As one
court described it, the Creppy Directive amounted to “a complete in-
formation blackout along both substantive and procedural dimen-
sions.”137
Various media and public interest groups attempted to obtain in-
formation about those noncitizens living in the United States who were
detained in the aftermath of September 11. In one set of cases, they
sought access to the detainees’ immigration hearings, arguing that the
Creppy Directive violated the First Amendment right of access.138 In
another case, parties challenged the government’s refusal to honor
their FOIA request for basic information about the post-September 11
detainees, including their names, date of arrest, and place of deten-
tion.139 Appellate courts reviewing the government’s national security
secrecy claims reached mixed results, and the Supreme Court declined
                                                                                                                     
134 See Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge of the United
States, to Immigration Judges and Court Administrators 1 (Sept. 21, 2001), available at
http://news.ªndlaw.com/hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf. Under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has authority over the “administration and
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135 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 202 (quoting declaration of Dale L. Watson).
136 Id. at 203.
137 Id. Regulations also permit government attorneys to submit information under seal
to the immigration judge, who is required to give “appropriate deference” to the govern-
ment’s contention that disclosure of the documents would harm national security. 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.46 (2004).
138 N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 203–04.
139 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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to review the issue. As a consequence, the public still has very little in-
formation about the identity and processing of these individuals.
1. Challenges to Closure of “Special Interest” Immigration Hearings
Two federal appellate courts—the Third and the Sixth Circuits—
examined the First Amendment challenges to the Creppy Directive
and reached opposite results.140 Although both courts agreed that the
Richmond Newspapers history-and-logic test applied to the removal pro-
ceedings, the Sixth Circuit applied the test and concluded that the
presumptive right of access attached, while the Third Circuit con-
cluded that it did not.141
In response to the First Amendment challenges to the Creppy
Directive, the government argued that the “[c]losure of removal pro-
ceedings in special interest cases is necessary to protect national secu-
rity by safeguarding the Government’s investigation of the September
11 terrorist attack and other terrorist conspiracies.”142 Speciªcally, the
government maintained that disclosing the names of the “special in-
terest” detainees would enable possible terrorists to compile seem-
ingly innocuous information and create a “mosaic” that would reveal
the direction, patterns, and progress of the investigation; this mosaic
would thus reveal which terrorist cells had been compromised and
which ports of entry were most dangerous.143
Both the Third and Sixth Circuits agreed that the two-pronged
history-and-logic test dictated the relevant inquiry for determining
whether there is a constitutional right of access to deportation hear-
ings.144 The courts rejected the government’s argument that the Ex-
                                                                                                                     
140 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 221; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710–
11 (6th Cir. 2002).
141 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 204–05; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700.
142 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705.
143 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 203; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705–06, 709. The gov-
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144 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 208–09 (holding that Richmond Newspapers “is a test
broadly applicable to issues of access to government proceedings, including removal”);
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ecutive’s plenary power over immigration required deference on “all
facets of immigration law” as long as they are “facially legitimate and
bona ªde,” noting that this deference was appropriate only to the Ex-
ecutive’s promulgation of substantive immigration laws, not rules of
procedure implicating constitutional rights.145 The courts also re-
jected the government’s contention that Richmond Newspapers applied
only to criminal proceedings, emphasizing that a removal proceeding
is an adversarial process that closely resembles a judicial trial.146
It was in the application of the Richmond Newspapers test, however,
where the courts’ agreement ended. The Sixth Circuit applied the his-
tory-and-logic test and concluded that there was a constitutional right
of access to the deportation hearings, and that the government had not
met its burden of showing the closure order was narrowly tailored to
address the government’s compelling interest in national security.147 In
contrast, the Third Circuit determined that there was not even a pre-
sumptive right of access to “special interest” deportation hearings be-
cause they failed both prongs of the history-and-logic inquiry.148
The courts’ disagreement ªrst centered on whether removal pro-
ceedings had a sufªcient tradition of openness to satisfy the history
prong. The Sixth Circuit found that “[a]lthough exceptions may have
been allowed, the general policy has been one of openness.”149 The
court noted that no immigration statute had ever required closure, and
that since 1965, INS regulations have provided explicitly for presump-
tively open proceedings.150 The court took notice of historical evidence
that some deportation hearings were conducted in prisons, hospitals,
and homes, but discounted these hearings as rare exceptions.151 The
                                                                                                                     
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 694, 700 (rejecting the government’s argument that a more
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145 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 685, 686 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753,
770 (1972)); see id. at 692–93.
146 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 207, 208–09; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 698–99. The
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147 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700, 705.
148 N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 221.
149 Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701.
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151 Id. at 703.
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Third Circuit, in contrast, placed much more emphasis on these excep-
tions, and concluded that the history of openness of deportation hear-
ings “has neither the pedigree nor uniformity necessary to satisfy Rich-
mond Newspapers’ ªrst prong.”152
Although the Third Circuit’s conclusion concerning the history
of openness of deportation proceedings is debatable in light of the
longstanding confusion concerning the application of the test,153 its
analysis of the logic prong was truly unprecedented. The Sixth Circuit
approached the logic inquiry in a traditional manner and concluded
that its requirements were met in the context of deportation hear-
ings.154 The court emphasized that public scrutiny was particularly
important in immigration proceedings because in that area “the gov-
ernment has nearly unlimited authority, [and] the press and the pub-
lic serve as perhaps the only check on abusive government prac-
tices.”155 In addition, after September 11, openness has particularly
signiªcant “cathartic” effect by serving as an outlet for the hostility
and high emotions resulting from the terrorist attacks.156
The Third Circuit, in contrast, voiced frustration that the “logic”
prong did not do much “work,” noting that it could not identify a case
where the proceedings passed the history test but failed the logic test.157
The court concluded that the logic prong therefore must require con-
sideration of not only whether openness can play a positive role, but
also whether openness could “impair[] the public good.”158 The court
                                                                                                                     
152 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 209. The court noted that “there is also evidence that,
in practice, deportation hearings have frequently been closed to the general public.” Id. at
212.
153 See Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 Comm.
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emphasized that “in the wake of September 11, 2001, a day on which
American life changed drastically and dramatically . . . the primary na-
tional policy must be self-preservation.”159 The Third Circuit summa-
rized the reasons the government gave for closing all “special interest”
deportation hearings—with no discussion of whether the government
assertions were reasonable or credible—and held that the government
had met its burden of presenting substantial evidence that a presump-
tion of open hearings could threaten national security.160 The Third
Circuit conceded that the government’s showing of national security
risk was “to some degree speculative,” but concluded that “[w]e are
quite hesitant to conduct a judicial inquiry into the credibility of these
security concerns, as national security is an area where courts have tra-
ditionally extended great deference to Executive expertise.”161
The Sixth Circuit was far more skeptical of the government’s na-
tional security argument. First, the court considered whether govern-
ment had met its burden of rebutting the presumption that the right of
access applied. To meet its burden, the government was required to
show that not only its compelling interest in closure, but also that the
broad Creppy Directive was narrowly tailored to serve this interest.162
The Sixth Circuit accepted that the government had a compelling in-
terest in preventing terrorism, and that the government’s “mosaic” ar-
gument had possible merit—that is, that terrorists could take “[b]its
and pieces of information that may appear innocuous in isolation” and
piece them together “to help form a ‘bigger picture’ of the govern-
ment’s terrorism investigation.”163 The court concluded, however, that
the government had not demonstrated that the Creppy order was nar-
rowly tailored to serve its national security interests, or that “no less re-
strictive alternative would serve the government’s purpose.”164 The
court explained that the government had failed to demonstrate why
immigration judges could not evaluate closure requests on a case-by-
case basis, employing in camera proceedings when necessary.165 The
court also rejected the government’s argument that divulging merely
the detainees’ names would provide too much information to potential
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terrorists, noting that the detainees and their lawyers were already free
to disclose their identities to the public.166 The court also remarked
that potential terrorists capable of “sophisticated intelligence-gathering”
would certainly be aware that one of their operatives was missing and
possibly in government custody.167 In addition, the court rejected the
government’s categorical invocation of the “mosaic intelligence” the-
ory.168 The court explained that if it accepted this argument, the gov-
ernment would be allowed to use national security as justiªcation for
closing any public hearing, including criminal proceedings.169 The court
was particularly concerned about accepting a “mosaic” theory in the
situation at hand, given that the government had failed to explain the
standards or procedures used to designate a particular deportation
hearing as a “special interest” hearing.170
Despite conºicting conclusions in the lower courts, the Supreme
Court declined to review the constitutionality of the Creppy Direc-
tive.171 One possible reason for this decision was the Solicitor General’s
representation to the Court that the Creppy Directive was no longer in
effect and that the issue of its constitutionality was therefore moot.172
2. Request for Detainee Information Under FOIA
Frustrated in their attempts to gain access to the “special interest”
deportation proceedings, the Center for National Security Studies, the
American Civil Liberties Union, and twenty-one other public interest
organizations committed to human rights and civil liberties issues ªled
a FOIA request to make public the identities of the detainees and their
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171 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 198.
172 See Devlin Barrett, Abuse of Detainees Spurs Homeland Changes, Monterey Herald,
¶¶ 3, 9, 7 (Apr. 14, 2004) (describing new rules), available at http://www.montereyher
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basis. See Mintz, New Rules, supra.
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attorneys, dates of arrest and release, locations of arrest and detention,
and the reasons for detention. To support their request, the plaintiffs
submitted press reports that “raised serious questions about ‘depriva-
tions of fundamental due process, including imprisonment without
probable cause, interference with the right to counsel, and threats of
serious bodily injury.’”173 In response, the government indicated that
the detainees fell into three categories: (1) individuals criminally
charged; (2) individuals held on immigration charges; and (3) material
witnesses.174 The Department of Justice agreed to release a small por-
tion of the requested information concerning the few detainees who
had been criminally charged. With respect to the immigration detain-
ees, however, the government refused to reveal their names, the names
of their counsel, the dates of arrest, any ªled charges, or the dates on
which any of the detainees had been released.175 The government re-
fused to disclose any information at all about the material witnesses.176
The requesters ªled suit in federal district court in the District of Co-
lumbia challenging the Department’s withholding decision.177
In opposing the lawsuit, the government claimed that the detainee
information was exempt from disclosure under FOIA because its re-
lease would interfere with the government’s counterterrorism efforts.
Throughout its brief, the government emphasized that the court must
defer to the Executive’s determination that releasing the information
would pose a threat to national security.178 Like the Creppy Directive,
which applied indiscriminately to post-September 11 detainees, the De-
partment of Justice’s response to the FOIA request did not distinguish
between the detainees who had been found to have terrorist connec-
tions and those who did not; instead, the Department asserted that the
information needed to be protected under a “mosaic” theory.179
Although the government claimed that “national security” con-
cerns required the nondisclosure of detainee information, the govern-
ment did not claim that this information was exempt from disclosure
under Exemption 1. As explained above, Exemption 1 applies only to
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information that has been properly classiªed pursuant to an Executive
order. Because information about the post-September 11 detainees had
not been classiªed, the government could not invoke that exemption.
Instead, the government claimed that the detainee information was ex-
empt from disclosure under FOIA pursuant to Exemptions 7(A), (C),
and (F).180 These exemptions permit the withholding of information
“compiled for law enforcement proceedings” when disclosure “(A)
could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy, . . . (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, [or] . . . (F) could reasonably
be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.181
The D.C. Circuit rejected the request for detainee information.182
Just as the Third Circuit created an exemption to the First Amendment
right of access for national security matters, the D.C. Circuit essentially
created a “national security” exception to FOIA. The court explained
that the appropriateness of judicial deference to the Executive “depends
on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure—that is, harm to the
national security—not the FOIA exemption invoked.183 At several points
throughout its opinion, the D.C. Circuit reiterated the importance of
judicial deference to the Executive when national security matters are at
issue.184 The court appeared concerned, as the government repeatedly
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181 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A), (C), (F) (2000). The government also claimed that in-
formation concerning individuals detained as “material witnesses” was exempt from disclo-
sure under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) and 6(e)(6), which bar the dis-
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because the government had failed to establish that any of the detainees actually had ap-
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formation was exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(A). Judge Tatel, in dissent,
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331 F.3d at 949 (Tatel, J., dissenting). Judge Tatel noted that, in fact, “the record indicates
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occur before a grand jury.” Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
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183 Id. at 928.
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2005] The Public's Right to Know and the War on Terror 67
warned in its brief,185 that grave consequences would result if the court
released the requested information about the detainees. The majority
noted that “[t]he need for deference in this case is just as strong as in
earlier cases. America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War
foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore.”186
Just as the Third Circuit did in North Jersey Media, the D.C. Circuit con-
cluded that when national security matters are implicated, it would be
“unwise to undertake searching judicial review.”187
Applying this extremely deferential mode of analysis, the court
accepted as “reasonable” the government’s argument that releasing
the names of all the post-September 11 detainees would enable poten-
tial terrorists to map the counterterrorism investigation and develop
ways to impede it.188 The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
terrorist organizations most likely know which of its members have
been detained, stating that it had “no way of assessing that likelihood”
and that even if it did, “a complete list of detainees could still have
great value in conªrming the status of their members.”189 A terrorist
group might not know that one of its members had been detained
brieºy and released, and if it learned that information, “this detainee
could be irreparably compromised as a source of information.”190 In
addition, the court explained, a released detainee might not be a
member of a terrorist group but merely have information about ter-
rorists who are members of their mosques or community groups.191
These individuals will be less likely to cooperate with ofªcials if their
names are released, and terrorist groups might attempt to intimidate
these individuals or feed them false or misleading information.192 The
Court also noted that future potential informants are less likely to
come forward if they believe their identities will be revealed.193
At a pivotal moment in its opinion, the majority seized on the vague
assertion in a government declaration that “concerns remain[ed]”
about the detainees’ links to terrorism to leap to the conclusion that in
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fact “many of the detainees have links to terrorism.”194 The court added
that “[t]his comes as no surprise given that the detainees were appre-
hended during the course of a terrorism investigation, and given that
several detainees have been charged with federal terrorism crimes or
held as enemy combatants.”195 The court disregarded the fact that, as of
the time the FOIA suit was ªled, only one detainee out of 1,182 had
been criminally charged in connection with the September 11 attacks,
and ignored as well the government’s concession that many of the de-
tainees included individuals proven to have no connection with terrorist
activity and “no information useful to the investigation.”196
The majority also agreed with the government’s contention that
disclosing the names of the detainees’ attorneys, or the dates and loca-
tions of arrest, detention, and release for each would have the same
potentially “disastrous” consequences as releasing the names of the de-
tainees themselves.197 The court predicted that the press would talk to
the attorneys to compile information about the detainees, and that the
remaining information concerning the date and place of their arrest,
detention, and release “would provide a chronological and geographi-
cal picture of the government investigation,” allowing terrorists to “de-
rive conclusions as to how [to] more adequately secure their clandes-
tine operations in future terrorist undertakings.”198 The Supreme
Court declined to review the D.C. Circuit’s ruling.199
The D.C. Circuit opinion in Center for National Security Studies exac-
erbates a longstanding tendency of the courts to defer to the Execu-
tive’s classiªcation decisions. Even before the terrorist attacks of Sep-
tember 11, courts and commentators had lamented the judiciary’s
excessive deference to the Executive’s classiªcation decisions. The text
of FOIA makes clear that all decisions to withhold information from
the public must be reviewed “de novo.” Affording broad, almost conclu-
sive deference to the Executive’s decisions regarding the disclosure of
information whenever the Executive asserts a “national security” need
for secrecy—whether for classiªed information subject to Exemption 1
or not—is contrary to Congress’s clear intention, and returns the pub-
lic’s right of access to its unfortunate status before FOIA, when the Ex-
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ecutive could withhold information on the basis of his unreviewable
determination that it was “in the public interest” to do so.
III. The Threat to the Right to Know
Although the Third and D.C. Circuits were evaluating different
claims—respectively, the First Amendment right of access and FOIA—
the cases are remarkably similar in a number of ways. Most obviously,
the two courts considered whether the public should be given access
to essentially the same information about the post-9/11 detainees,
and in doing so, both courts had to evaluate the government claims
that such access would threaten national security.200 Beneath the sur-
face, the two decisions also reºected deeper misgivings as to the value
of the right of access, particularly when the government alleges that
releasing the information could harm national security, and even
more so when that information concerns noncitizens, a group histori-
cally suspect in times of war.
A. Ampliªcation of Pre-Existing Doctrinal Confusion
The Third and D.C. Circuits’ decisions reºect the judiciary’s his-
toric hostility to the right of access under FOIA and the First Amend-
ment, particularly when the information sought allegedly concerns
national security. Both rights are relatively new, and throughout their
brief history the courts have demonstrated a persistent reluctance to
question the Executive’s claims that national security requires secrecy.
Given the Court’s failure to reconcile Richmond Newspapers with its
prior decisions, it is not surprising that the lower courts have disagreed
about whether the First Amendment right of access applies outside of
judicial proceedings. Some courts have held that Richmond Newspapers
has no application to the executive and legislative branches, holding
that in such cases the applicable rule is that of the Houchins plurality—
that the First Amendment does not guarantee a right of access to gov-
ernment information.201 Although the Third Circuit rejected the gov-
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ernment’s argument that Richmond Newspapers did not apply to immi-
gration proceedings, its utter failure to recognize the importance of the
right of access is the same as that expressed in the majority and plural-
ity decisions in Pell, Houchins, and Saxbe.202
Even more dramatically, the differences between the Third and
Sixth Circuit opinions demonstrate the difªculties of applying the
“history-and-logic” test outside of the context of a judicial proceeding.
The ªrst problematic prong is the “history” inquiry. Although Rich-
mond Newspapers noted that the history of open criminal trials ex-
tended from the time of the Norman Conquest to the present, often
no historical analog is available for consideration, or the history of
openness is limited or mixed.203 As a result, most courts have held that
a history of openness with the same pedigree of a criminal trial is not
necessary to satisfy the history prong. Instead, as one professor noted,
“some [courts] have drawn analogies with established proceedings or
have examined the history, however short, of the speciªc proceeding
at issue.”204 Others have discounted the importance of a historical
tradition altogether and instead emphasized the logic prong and the
structural value of access, thus extending the right of access to pro-
ceedings possessing very little history at all, including administrative
proceedings such as unemployment beneªt hearings and fact-ªnding
hearings of the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration.205
The logic prong has also been a lightening rod for criticism. In
Globe Newspaper, the Court explained that this inquiry asks whether a
right of access “plays a particularly signiªcant role in the functioning
of the judicial process and the government as a whole.”206 For exam-
ple, the Court noted, public scrutiny of a trial can enhance the quality
of the proceedings by serving as a check on the judiciary as well as the
integrity of the fact-ªnding process, foster the appearance of fairness
and increase public respect for the judicial system, and encourage
public participation in the government.207 In Press-Enterprise II, de-
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cided only two years later, a dissenting Justice Stevens noted that the
logic prong “proves too much” because it is hard to imagine any pro-
ceeding in which there would be no value in public openness.208 Most
proceedings, he explained, are arguably an “important step” in the
judicial process in which public monitoring could be valuable, and
closure of any judicial proceedings would arguably deny an outlet for
“community rage.”209 Similarly, some commentators have argued that
the logic prong gives “little principled guidance” to courts attempting
to resolve access claims.210
Although the Third Circuit’s general approach to the history
prong of the Richmond Newspapers test was not signiªcantly different
from that of the Sixth Circuit, its application of the logic prong was
novel. Rather than consider the value of public access to removal hear-
ings in general, the court considered the value of public access to the
particular subset of “special interest” removal hearings. This approach
was plainly inconsistent with Globe Newspaper, in which the Supreme
Court made clear that the proper inquiry is whether there is a right of
access to criminal trials generally rather than rape trials speciªcally.211
The Sixth Circuit’s misapplication of the logic prong of the right of ac-
cess threatens to undermine the right entirely. Weighing the “public
interest” in national security in the logic prong signiªcantly lowers the
standard the government must meet to obtain closure. The Third Cir-
cuit itself recognized the “force of [the plaintiffs’] contention” that the
government’s showing would not satisfy strict scrutiny if the court had
concluded that the presumptive right of access attached.212
The D.C. Circuit’s decision similarly brought to the forefront the
limitations that have plagued FOIA since its inception. As discussed ear-
lier, the courts persist in deferring to the Executive’s claims regarding
the continued non-disclosure of classiªed information pursuant to
FOIA’s Exemption 1, despite Congress’s efforts to compel more search-
ing judicial review.213 In Center for National Security Studies, the court took
this deference one step farther, ªnding that it is appropriate to defer to
                                                                                                                     
208 See 478 U.S. at 25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
209 See id. at 25–26.
210 See Olson, supra note 153, at 488; see also BeVier, supra note 66, at 338–39 (arguing
that the logic prong “does not provide meaningful guidance”); Kitrosser, supra note 2, at
115 (noting that “a logic prong so unclear in its theoretical grounding and practical impli-
cations as that relied upon by the Supreme Court cannot meaningfully contribute to the
assessment of access claims”).
211 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604–06.
212 See N. Jersey Media, 308 F.3d at 219 n.14.
213 See supra Part I.B.
72 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 25:35
the Executive’s assessment that releasing information would harm na-
tional security, even when the information at issue is not classiªed.214 In
so doing, the D.C. Circuit has essentially created a broad “national se-
curity” exception to FOIA.
B. Failure to Recognize the Value of the Public’s Right to Know
Even more disturbing in the recent access cases was the judici-
ary’s view that the right of access lacks signiªcant value. Both the D.C.
and Third Circuits failed to recognize the importance of an open
government for the democratic process.
When determining whether the public’s interest in openness
proceedings outweighed the government’s interest in national secu-
rity, the Third Circuit gave virtually no weight to the democratic im-
portance of openness and the checking function that informed public
debate can have on government actors.215 Instead, the court dispar-
aged the value of openness as merely providing a “community beneªt
of emotional catharsis.” With this limited view of the value of the right
of access, the court not surprisingly concluded that it was “impossible”
to weigh this interest “against the security risk of disclosing the United
States’ methods of investigation and the extent of its knowledge.”216
Indeed, the Third Circuit went so far as to state that “the reality” was
that “the persons most directly affected by the Creppy Directive are
the media.”217 Both the Third and D.C. Circuits accepted the govern-
ment’s assurances that it had respected the civil liberties of the de-
tainees by protecting their due process rights and providing them ac-
cess to counsel. The D.C. Circuit explained that press access was
unnecessary because the detainees “had access to counsel, access to
the courts, and freedom to contact the press or the public at large.”218
As has now been well-documented, the Justice Department neither
respected the civil liberties of the detainees nor afforded them a timely
or adequate means of communicating with their families or counsel,
much less the press. Shortly before the D.C. Circuit’s opinion was is-
sued, the Department of Justice’s own Inspector General released a re-
port revealing myriad problems with the government’s handling of de-
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tainees.219 For example, the detainees waited an average of ªfteen days
to receive notice of the charges against them.220 Some were held in un-
duly harsh conditions and subjected to abuse and mistreatment.221 The
Bureau of Prisons imposed a “communications blackout” that lasted
several weeks, during which the detainees were not permitted to re-
ceive or make telephone calls, have visitors, or send mail.222 Even after
this time, prison ofªcials continued to withhold the detainees’ location
from attorneys and family members.223 The detainees had great
difªculty obtaining legal representation because they were permitted
only one weekly phone call, and the lists of attorneys the government
provided were outdated and contained incorrect phone numbers.224
Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that “many of the detainees
have links to terrorism,”225 most of them did not. According to the In-
spector General’s report, many detainees were targeted on vague and
inconclusive evidence, such as “a landlord reporting suspicious activity
by an Arab tenant,” or someone complaining that a retail store had
“too many” Middle Eastern employees.226 As Professor David Cole has
said, the Inspector General’s report revealed that “Ashcroft was shoot-
ing in the dark and virtually every one of his shots missed.”227 Of the
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estimated 5,000 alien detainees, only three have been charged with
crimes relating to terrorism, and none relating to the September 11
attacks.228
In any event, the courts’ focus on the underlying rights of the
detainees ignores the broader purposes of the right of access. It is not
simply the media that beneªts from openness, but the public that they
serve. It is through the press—and increasingly watchdog groups—
that the public learn about the government’s processes and see for
themselves whether those processes are fair. It is not merely about the
“emotional catharsis” value of openness, but the democratic values
this openness serves. If the government released information about
the detainees and it turned out that the detainees were treated prop-
erly, this fact would increase the public’s conªdence in the govern-
ment. Instead, by concealing detainee information, the government
only gives credence to the suspicion that the government has some-
thing to hide.
The Sixth Circuit had no trouble identifying the public’s interest
in presumptively open removal proceedings, particularly in a time of
crisis.229 It closed its opinion by noting that the open proceedings best
served the public’s interest, particularly after September 11, in order to
“ensur[e] that our government is held accountable to the people and
that First Amendment rights are not impermissibly compromised.”230
Noting that “[d]emocracies die behind closed doors,” the court said
that:
[i]t would be ironic, indeed, to allow the Government’s as-
sertion of plenary power to transform the First Amendment
from the great instrument of open democracy to a safe har-
bor from public scrutiny. . . . Even though the political
branches may have unfettered discretion to deport and ex-
clude certain people, requiring the Government to account
for their choices assures an informed public—a foundational
principle of democracy.231
It is difªcult to comprehend how public pressure can begin to be ef-
fective if the public does not even have sufªcient information by
which to judge its government.
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C. Public Pressure is Unreliable and Insufªcient
In rejecting the right of access to deportation proceedings for
immigrants rounded up after the September 11 terrorist attacks, the
Third Circuit also suggested that the right of access was unimportant
because there was, “as always, the powerful check of political account-
ability on Executive discretion.”232 This statement reºects the court’s
profound misconception of the role of judicial review and the impor-
tant role of the courts in checking the other two branches of govern-
ment. The Third Circuit abdicated its role and left it to the political
process to check the government’s failure to disclose information.
This approach is not a novel one, and indeed was the majority
view of the Court prior to the Richmond Newspapers decision in 1980.
Justice Stewart famously declared in a law review article he authored:
There is no constitutional right to have access to particular
government information, or to require openness from the
bureaucracy. . . . The Constitution itself is neither a Freedom
of Information Act nor an Ofªcial Secrets Act. . . . [W]e must
rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug and pull of
the political forces in American society.233
Chief Justice Burger argued in the plurality opinion in Houchins
(prior to Richmond Newspapers) that recognizing the right of access
would “invite[] the Court to involve itself in what is clearly a legislative
task which the Constitution has left to the political processes” and that
instead, “we must rely, as so often in our system we must, on the tug
and pull of the political forces in American society.”234
But as scholars have argued for decades, abandoning the right of
access to the whims of the political process is problematic. The govern-
ment’s tendency to suppress damaging news and to highlight favorable
news is often a deliberate effort to skew public debate and the public’s
perception of the government’s performance and foreign affairs.235
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Former executive branch ofªcials have admitted that they selectively
released sensitive information in a conscious effort to generate public
support for its policies or serve some other bureaucratic or personal
agenda.236 For example, former national security advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski admitted that he released otherwise sensitive information
for “explicit administration purposes,” the former Assistant Secretary of
Defense under President Carter conceded that “he ‘had the authority
to declassify particular pieces of information when that seemed neces-
sary,’” and a White House ofªcial under President Kennedy agreed that
high-ranking administration ofªcials “knowingly and deliberately dis-
seminated [classiªed] information from time to time in order to ad-
vance the interests of a particular person, [or] policy.”237 As one com-
mentator noted, “the executive’s power to classify and declassify
information raises the specter of government misinformation, or its
weaker and less noxious relative, ‘spin control.’”238 The result is a dis-
tortion of the public debate on fundamental public issues.
Although the Executive has not hesitated to release details con-
cerning the arrest and prosecution of individuals believed to have a
connection to terrorism—such as Hamdi, Padilla, and Moussaoui—
the Executive has continued to resist information requests regarding
the other individuals investigated after September 11 who have been
found to have no connection to terrorism. This sort of selective dis-
closure of information raises the concern that the government is
abusing the “national security” umbrella to conceal its counterter-
rorism efforts that have been less than successful and in turn to “spin”
public debate on the government’s performance.
The political process notoriously has failed to force the disclosure
of information, particularly in times of crisis. A particularly instructive
example of this failure is the “trial” of eight Nazi saboteurs during
World War II.239
In 1942, eight Nazis landed on the shores of the United States in a
bungled attempt to sabotage the nation’s industrial complexes.240 Their
plans were never set in motion, and their brief visit to the United States
was cut short after one member of the conspiracy turned everyone in
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to the FBI.241 Although the government announced that the FBI had
foiled a Nazi plot and released some information about the plot itself
and the identities of the captured, it purposely failed to disseminate any
information about the conditions of the arrests in order to obtain the
greatest political beneªt possible.242 The government implied that
other sabotage attempts were possible, and that therefore releasing in-
formation about how these eight men were captured might undermine
the government’s efforts.243 As a result, the public celebrated the FBI’s
“victory” over the Nazis, a bit of good news in an otherwise grim period
of the war.244
The government speciªcally chose to use a military tribunal to
try the saboteurs in order to conduct the proceedings in secret.245 The
tribunal announced that this secrecy was essential for national secu-
rity, while in truth, the government merely did not want to reveal that
one of the saboteurs had surrendered the group.246 The trial was held
on the ªfth ºoor of the Department of Justice, in a lecture room liter-
ally shrouded in secrecy, with heavy black curtains draped over the
windows and the glass doors on each end of the room blacked out.247
The press and public were excluded from the proceedings, except
when a small group of reporters was permitted to take pictures of the
hearing room while proceedings were suspended.248 General McCoy,
the president of the commission, issued daily communiqués to the
press about the trial, but these releases typically consisted of little
more than the times the hearings commenced and concluded.249
Although the press was frustrated with its limited access to the pro-
ceedings, the secrecy did not bother the public much at all.250 Instead,
the public’s debate focused on why the government was taking so long
to execute these men and whether death by hanging or ªring squad
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was more appropriate.251 When the Supreme Court announced it
would hold a special session to consider the defendants’ habeas corpus
claim of entitlement to trial before a civil court, the public and most of
the press expressed outrage that such a “spectacle” would be held for “a
group that came among us to blast, burn and kill.”252 There was no
public pressure to hold the military trial proceedings in the open; if
anything, the public was pressuring the government not to hold any
trial at all.
The treatment of the Nazi saboteurs is of course just one example
of a time during the history of the United States when the majority
has willingly jettisoned the civil liberties of minority groups. During
the Palmer Raids in the 1920s, the public did not complain when im-
migrants were rounded up as suspects in the bombing of Attorney
General Palmer’s home. During World War II, the public did not ob-
ject to the internment of citizens and noncitizens of Japanese, Italian,
or German origin. Undoubtedly such apathy is due at least in part to
the majority’s readiness to regard foreigners as inherently suspect.
This is not to deny that public pressure has at times been an ef-
fective mechanism for forcing greater government transparency. But
during the so-called “War on Terror,” the political process has led to
the arbitrary and calculated declassiªcation and release of informa-
tion. The arbitrariness of the classiªcation system as well as the Execu-
tive’s prerogative to override the classiªcation system has become
clear as the executive branch has selectively agreed to declassify
documents in response to pressure from the September 11 Commis-
sion. With the September 11 Commission’s investigation of the failure
to prevent the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, the execu-
tive branch ªnds itself declassifying information in response to politi-
cal pressure. But three years have passed since September 11. Access
to three-year-old government information, although still valuable, is
no substitute for the timely receipt of information.
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Political pressure has been notably ineffective or virtually nonex-
istent when noncitizens are involved. Most obviously, noncitizens can-
not vote, and as a result they wield little political might. Instead, they
must rely on voting citizens to be sufªciently concerned with the con-
duct of elected ofªcials to exercise political muscle for those who are
disenfranchised.253 This remote possibility becomes even less likely
when the government conceals or distorts information about its treat-
ment of noncitizens. Certainly with respect to the post-9/11 detainees,
some watchdog groups suspected that, based on the limited informa-
tion they managed to amass, the detainees were mistreated. In the face
of the government’s continued denials of maltreatment, however, their
concerns were easily dismissed as hysterical.
Conclusion
The Freedom of Information Act and the First Amendment right
of access have served as poor tools for ensuring the public’s ability to
obtain information about the government’s detention of individuals
as part of its counterterrorism efforts. As demonstrated above, a vari-
ety of factors contribute to this problem. FOIA is riddled with large,
undeªned exceptions. When information arguably involves national
security, courts are too timid to force the executive branch to provide
a thorough explanation for continued secrecy. The First Amendment
right of access likewise has signiªcant limitations. Although the scope
of the right has expanded signiªcantly since the Supreme Court ªrst
recognized it in the Richmond Newspapers decision, its scope remains
severely limited. Courts have been willing to extend the right beyond
criminal trials to include some criminal and civil pre-trial proceedings
and records, but they have hesitated to recognize the right outside of
the judicial context. Even when they have willingly recognized the ex-
tension of the right into administrative proceedings, courts have
twisted the Richmond Newspapers test so as to favor the continued con-
cealment of any information allegedly pertaining to national security.
The “right to know” has encountered additional and more disturb-
ing problems since the terrorist attacks of September 11. Not only has
the courts’ tendency to defer to the Executive’s national security risk
assessment become exaggerated, but courts now appear overtly hostile
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to the very existence of a right of access during a time of crisis. Instead,
they suggest that an enforceable right to know is unnecessary because
the political process is adequate to force government disclosure. History
demonstrates, however, that the political process is woefully inadequate
to realize this purpose. Although the government has been somewhat
more forthcoming with information about detained citizens, its volun-
tary disclosure in reality is little more than a smoke-screen. In the end,
the public has been receiving insufªcient information about the gov-
ernment’s counterterrorism efforts with respect to citizens and nonciti-
zens alike to make an informed judgment about its performance.
